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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD J. YOUNG, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JULIA M. BARNEY and UTAH 
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10519 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Appellant is appealing from the Order of the 
trial court granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss as 
to the defendant, Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Com-
pany. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amend-
ed complaint and this motion was granted by the trial 
1 
court as to the defendant insurance company. The ; 
court also denied plaintiff's motion for production of ' 
the policy of insurance upon which the amended com-
plaint was based. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents submit that the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah should affirm the order of the 
trial court in dismissing the amended complaint, deny-
ing the plaintiff's motion for production of an alleged 
insurance policy and denying the plaintiff's demand 
for answers to interrogatories. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents agree with the statement of facts 
as set forth in appellant's brief, but in doing so the 
respondents do not admit the unproved and unsup-
ported allegations referred to in appellant's pleadings 
and statement of facts. 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISS-
ING AND STRIKING THE AMENDED COM-
PLAINT. 
The lower court in dismissing the appellant's 
attempted joinder of the insurance carrier and in deny-
ing discovery of the alleged insurance policy sets forth 
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the basis of such action in a memorandum decision 
(R34). In paragraph 4 of the memorandum decision 
the lower court said : 
"All of the above matters which are noted as 
requiring striking of them are entirely imma-
terial and irrelevant in this action." (R34). 
Finding the same to be immaterial and irrelevant the 
lower court accordingly ordered the amended complaint 
stricken and dismissed ( R35) . 
It is submitted that the judgment of the lower court 
is correct and is supported by both logic and law. 
The appellant in support of his appeal relies on 
Rules 18 (a), 18 ( b) and 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 18 (a) first permits the joinder either 
as independent or as alternate claims as many claims 
as one may have against an opposing party. The Rule 
then provides for a like joinder of claims where there 
are multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19, 
20 and 22 are satisfied. Rule 18 thus concerns itself 
only with various claims which may have arisen against 
the same party and permits joinder of various claims 
against various defendants only if Rules 19, 20 and 
22 are satisfied. 
It is obvious that the requirements of Rules 19 
and 22 have not been satisfied and the appellant does 
not contend that they have. The appellant suggests 
that he has satisfied the requirements of Rule 20 and 
relies on that Rule. This Rule provides for joinder 
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of a person where the claims against such person have 
arisen out of the same transaction of occurrence or 1 
series of transactions or occurrences from which plain-
tiff's claim against the other parties arose and if any 
question of law of fact common to all parties defendant 
will arise in the action. Clearly defendant Barney's 
act of obtaining insurance coverage did not arise out 
of the same transaction or occurrence upon which plain-
tiff's negligence action against Barney is based and 
certainly there is no common question of law or fact 
connecting the two separate acts. 
The material found in Section 10 of an annotation 
reported in 61 A.L.R. 2d 688 is instructive: 
""Thile some federal cases express the view 
that Federal Rule 18 (b) permits the joinder of 
a claim against a tortfeasor and a claim against 
his liability insurer, no case actually so holding 
has been found. "\Vhere not specifically permitted 
by other provisions of the law, such j oinder has 
been held improper for various reasons. Some 
cases proceed on the theory that Rule 18 (b) is 
not applicable where the joinder is against the 
law or public policy of the state in which the 
federal court is siting. Other cases reach the same 
result without any reference to Federal Rule 
18(b)." 
It is submitted that the substantive law is well 
settled conclusively against the appellant and that the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not abridge, enlarge 
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 78· 
2-4 U.C.A., provides as follows: 
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"The Supreme Court of the state of Utah has 
power to prescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for 
all courts of the state of Utah, the forms of pro-
cess, writs, pleadings and motions and the prac-
tice and procedure in all civil and criminal ac-
tions and proceedings, including rules of evi-
dence therein, and also divorce, probate and 
guardianship proceedings. Such rules may not 
abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights 
of any litigant." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has previously spoken 
on the subject of joinder in the case of UTAH F ARl\l 
BUREAU INS. CO. v. CHUGG, 6 Utah 2d 399, 
315 P. 2d 277 ( 1957) . The court said: 
" ... Had Larson objected to his joinder in 
this action, which he did not do, nor did he ap-
pear in this court to voice such objection, it 
would have been error to have compelled his 
joinder even under a most liberal view of Rule 
20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and we want 
to repel any inference which may be drawn from 
this opinion that one who claims to be damaged 
by the negligent act of another, is a proper party 
to an action by the insurer of the latter under 
a public liability policy, whereby a declaratory 
judgment is sought declaring th~ legal effect of 
the terms of such policy. 
The "transaction" involved in this action is 
one between the insurer and insured, namely 
their contract. Such contract can be construed 
without reference to any liability having accrued 
thereunder. This being so, there is no issue of 
law or fact in common between the insurer and 
the plaintiff, or potential plaintiff, to a tort ac-
tion against the insured. The tort victim has 
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no present legal interest in the insurance con-
tract. To drag him into the declaratory judg-
ment action is to import into it a totally differ-
ent controversy, and then assert that there are 
issues of law or fact in common. Indeed, if such 
tort victim is a proper party to the present action, 
then it would appear that the insurance com-
pany, and other companies similarly situated, 
is a proper party to a tort action against the 
insured-a proposition which, it is safe to as-
sume, such companies would not espouse." 
An annotation found in 7 A.L.R. 1003 sets forth 
the general rule as follows: 
"It seems to be clear that in the absence of 
permissive statutory provision a cause of action 
for personal injuries negligently inflicted cannot 
be jqined with a cause of action against an in-
demnity company on a contract of insurance." 
The general rule is also stated in 7 Am. J ur. 2d 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, Section 210, which 
states: 
"As a general rule, and in the absence of a 
contractual or statutory provision in such re· 
spect, there is no privity between an injured per-
son and a liability insurer, and the former has 
no right of ~ction at law against the latter. It 
follows, therefore, that the injured person in 
such ca~e cannot join the insured and the lia· 
bility insurer as parties defendant." 
See also 29(a) Am. Jur. 2d INSURANCE, Section 
1485. 
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lt is apparent from the material cited that Utah 
has adopted the general rule. The only jurisdiction 
holding to the contrary seem to be where there has 
been a statutory change of the common law. 
Utah has long recognized the inherent mischief 
of introducing the fact of the existence or non-existence 
of insurance coverage. In a long line of cases from the 
Supreme Court of Utah it has been stated and re-
stated that insurance coverage is immaterial and irrele-
vant to the issues of liability and damage and that to 
introduce such fact to the jurors would tend to preju-
dice one of the parties. If the knowledge of insurance 
is irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial, then the 
joinder of an insurance carrier as a party defendant 
would be even more so. 
In the case of BALLE v. SMITH, 81 Utah 179, 
17 P. 2d 224 ( 1932), the court said: 
"The universal rule is that it is irrelevant to 
the issue of negligence whether the defendant is 
carrying liability insurance or not, and, subject 
to some qualificatons which need not be here 
mentioned, such testimony is wholly inadmissible. 
Courts have guarded jealously against the intro-
duction of such evidence before the jury, not 
only because it is irrelevant to the issue, but be-
cause jurors are commonly thought to be preju-
diced against insurance companies, and, if the 
fact were known that the defendant is insured, 
jurors would be less inclined to consider the case 
on the merits, and more inclined to render a 
verdict for plaintiff and in a larger amount than 
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if the defendant, especially where the defendant 
is an individual, had to bear the loss alone ... " 
In the case of SALTAS v. AFFLECK, 99 Utah 
381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940), the court said: 
" ... Neither this court nor the trial court is 
concerned about the question as to whether a 
defendant carries insurance. Nor should the jury 
be so concerned. The cases indicate that this 
question, which should not be and is not a matter 
of concern, is often injected in indirect ways 
upon this matter of insurance giving rise to many 
cases ... " 
In the case of MORRISON v. PERRY, 104 
Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943), the court said: 
"It is apparent the only purpose for such per· 
sistent question was to tell the jury that defend· 
ant was insured. From the record it appears that 
plaintiff's counsel knew that Mr. Williams was 
employed by the insurance company and conse· 
quently he could anticipate the witness' answer. '¥ e need not cite authority for the 1'toposition 
that the question of indemnity insurance in a 
case such as this is irrelevant. It is also a well· 
known fact that juries are influenced in deter· 
mining liability and the amount of recovery by 
the fact that an insurance company would pay 
the damages." 
In the case of IVIE v. RICHARDSON, 9 Utah 
2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 ( 1959), the court held that plain· 
tiff's counsel conducted himself improperly in examin· 
ing a witness for the "thinly veiled design of getting 
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the fact of insurance before the jury". 
In the case of HILL v. CONRAD, H Utah :Zd 
55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962), the court said: 
"It seems hardly necessary to state that the 
matter of insurance is quite immaterial to issues 
as to liability and damages, or the amount there-
of. It is also true that inasmuch as the defendant 
is entitled to have this extraneous matter ex-
cluded from the case, the plaintiff is entitled to 
the same protection if he so desires. If the de-
fendant were allowed to sh9w non-insurance, 
and the plaintiff allowed to rebut it, the mischief 
which could develop from preoccupation with the 
immaterial issue is obvious. In the instant situ-
ation candor requires recognition that it was 
improper for the defendant to inject the matter 
of insurance into the case." 
In the case of ROBINSON v. HREINSON, 17 
Utah 2d 261, 409 P. 2d 121 (1965), the court said: 
"'Ve do not depart from our former position: 
that the question of insurance_ ~s immaterial and 
should not be injected into the trial; and that it 
is the duty of both counsel and the court to guard 
against it." 
The joinder of the insurance earner as a party 
defendant serves no useful purpose. The right of the 
injured to collect from the insurance carrier of the 
insured without the joinder of the insurance carrier as 
a party defendant is not in question. The duty of the 
insurance carrier to satisfy the judgment taken against 
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the insured is clear and is required by the statutes of 
Utah, 41-12-21, Utah Code Annot ated, 1953. 
The appellant complains that a plaintiff is preju-
diced by keeping defendant's insurance coverage from 
the knowledge of the jury and that by doing so an 
attempt is made to create the impression that the "de-
fendant is one that will be liable to pay the judgment 
and will be the victim of a judgment large or small." 
The appellant argues, in effect, that it would be better 
to prejudice the defendant and his insurance carrier 
by letting the jury know that any judgment granted 
will be satisfied from the supposedly deep pocket of 
the insurer. This suggestion of the appellant is not 
only illogical but it overlooks the well-established law 
to the contrary. 
The appellant in his brief makes some note of the 
typical "no action clause" and then asks the court to 
distinguish this case from the general and prevailing 
rule that where a policy contains such a provision that 
an action cannot be brought in the first instance against 
the insurer until the determination of the liability has 
been made. It is respectfully submitted that this quei-
tion is not before the court and that the court cannot 
intelligently deal with this question since the insurance 
policy and its "no action clause" is not a part of the 
record. Evei:i if it were, the general rule is contrary 
to the position urged by the appellant. The rule is 
stated in 159 A.L.R. 763, as follows: 
"The validity of a clause in a casualty insur· 
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ance policy providing that no action shall be 
instituted against the insurer until the liability 
of the insured shall have been determined by a 
final judgment or by agreement of the parties 
has generally been sustained." 
The suggestoin of the appellant that this case is 
distinguishable because the defendant insurance com-
pany was not brought in until it had taken over the 
defense of the case seems to this writer to be without 
merit. The substantive law can't be avoided or changed 
by merely filing an amended complaint and joining 
the insurance carrier after the carrier, in accordance 
with the terms of the insurance contract, undertakes 
the defense of the insured. 
The appellant urges this court to recognize that 
a party under a contract made for his benefit may sue 
on the contract without having been a party to the 
contract. Respondents admit this to be a correct state-
ment of the law but note that an insurance contract is 
not a third party beneficiary contract but an indem-
nity contract running to the insured and insuring him 
against liability. 
Stripped of all sham, the plaintiff's only purpose 
in the joining of the insurance carrier is to expose to 
the jury the insurance policy which is an asset of the 
defendant. If this asset is to be exposed, then why 
not the other assets of the defendant, and if the de-
fendant's assets are exposed he would certainly have 
the right to introduce evidence of his liabilities-his 
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notes and payables due and to become due, his tax ' 
liabilities, his duties to educate and provide for hi~ 
minor children and his aged parents, the alimony he 
must pay to his ex-wife, prior judgments against him 
-the possibilities are endless. Perhaps the loss ratio 
of the insurance carrier and a discussion of insurance 
rates by an actuary would become material. If the 
financial condition of the defendant and his insurance 
carrier is material, then why not the financial condition 
of the plaintiff? 
Let us suppose that the defendant had no insurance 
policy and no other assets. Would the appellant be 
happy to have these facts exposed to the jm·y? Would 
such an exposure be any aid to a jury in determining 
the liability of the defendant or the damages suffered 
by the plaintiff? If the existence of an insurance policy 
is exposed by permitting the j oinder of the insurance 
carrier as a party defendant, the Box of Pandora 
will have been opened. 
It seems to the writer of this brief that the exist· 
ence or nonexistence of insurance coverage would be 
no more extraneous to the issues of liability and damage 
than the defendant's preference in girls, ice cream, 
sports and r:eligion. To introduce such a concept into 
a negligence trial before a jury would be to place the 
jury in the untenable position of attempting to appor· 
tion a defendant's estate and the assets of the insurance 
company among the competing claims made upon those 
assets. 
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The law has long recognized that neither the de-
fendant's liability nor the plaintiff's damages can be 
predicated upon the defendant's ability to satisfy a 
judgment granted against him. There appears to be 
no valid, logical or lawful reason why this should now 
be done. The only reason submitted by the appellant 
is that he would like to have the jury prejudiced in 
his favor, and prejudice it would be, since such knowl-
edge fails to illuminate the two issues to be decided 
by the jury: the issue of the defendant's ability and 
the issue of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
It is respectfully submitted that appellant has 
failed to cite one authority supporting the position 
he urges upon the court. It must be admitted, however, 
that appellant's candor in urging this court to change 
the law because of some imagined prejudice is refresh-
ing. It is submitted, notwithstanding such refreshing 
candor, that the present law is premised upon logic 
and sound reason and that to adopt the appellant's 
position would create problems far greater than the 
imagined problem the appellant seeks so valiantly to 
cure. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING PRODUCTION OF AN ALLEGED IN-
SURANCE POLICY NOR IN DENYING AP-
13 
PELLANT'S DEJVIAND FOR ANS\VERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES. 
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for the production of documents which con-
stitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters 
within the scope of the examination permitted by 
Rule 26 (b). Rule 26 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide as follows: 
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court as pro-
vided by Rule 30 ( b) or ( d), the deponent may 
be examined regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates 
to the claim or defense of the examining party, 
or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, cus-
tody, condition and location of any books, docu-
mnts, or other tangible things and the identity 
and location of persons having knowledge of 
relevant facts. It is not ground for objection 
that the testimony will be inadmissible at the 
trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence." 
It is submitted that the insurance policy is not 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action and that it will not lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence. Under the rules the insurance policy 
is clearly not subject to discovery since it is not relevant 
and since it will not lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
14 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the recent case of 
SANDERS v. AYRHART, 404 P. 2d 589 (1965), 
in sustaining the defendant's refusal to answer oral 
interrogatories concerning his insurance coverage, 
adopted the language used in the case of JEPPSON 
v. SWANSON, 68 N:\V. 2d 649 (Minn. 1955), m 
which the court states: 
"It would seem to us that, even though the 
discovery is not to be limited to facts which may 
be admissible as evidence the ultimate goal is 
to ascertain facts or information which may be 
used for proof or defense of an action. Such in-
formation may be discovered by leads from other 
discoverable information. The purpose of the 
discovery rules is to take the surprise out of 
trials of cases, so that all relevant facts and in-
formation pertaining to the action may be ascer-
tained in advance of trial. Where it is sought to 
discover information which can have no possible 
bearing on the determination of the action on its 
merits, it can hardly be within the rule. It is not 
intended to supply information for the personal 
use of a litigant that has no connection with the 
determination of the issues involved in the action 
on their merits. BALAZS v. ANDERSON, 
D.C.N.D. Ohio, 77 F. Supp. 612, 68 N.W. 2d 
at P. 656. 
"Under the guise of liberal construction, we 
should not emasculate the rules by permitting 
something which never was intended or is not 
within the declared objects for which they were 
adopted. Neither should expedience or the desire 
to dispose of lawsuits without trial, however de-
sirable that may be from the standpoint of reliev-
15 
ing congested calendars, be permitted to cause 
us to lose sight of the limitations of the discovery 
rules or the boundaries beyond which we should 
not go. If, perchance we have the power under 1 
the ~nabling act to extend the discovery rules 
to permit discovery of information desired for 
the sole purpose of encouraging or assisting in 
negotiations for settlement of tort claims, it 
woudl be far better to amend the rules so as to 
state what may and what may not be done in 
that field than to stretch the present discovery 
rules so as to accomplish something which the 
language of the rules does not permit." ( 404 
P. 2d 592). 
The great majority of the State Courts have re-
fused to require defendants to reveal the information 
as to defendant's liability insurance coverage.< 1> 
There has been briefed and argued to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah and there is now pending 
before the court in the case of PHILLIP E. ELLIS 
and CAROLYN B. ELLIS, Plaintiffs and Respond-
ents, vs. MRS. BETTY GILBERT, Defendant and 
1 Arizona, DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 327 P.2d 746 
(1958); Connecticut, Verrastro v. Grecco, 149 A.2d 703 (1958); 
Delaware, Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514; Florida, Brooks v. 
Owens, 97 So.2d 693; Georgia, Patillo v. Thompson, 128 S.E.2d 
656; Idaho, Sanders v. Ayrhart, 404 P.2d 589 ( 1965); Minne-
sota, Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); Missouri, 
State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (does allow name 
of company, but not terms of contract); Montana, State ex rel. 
Hersman v. District Court of Sixth Judicial District, 381 P.2d 
799 (1963); Nebraska, Mecke v. Bahr, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964); 
Nevada, State ex rel. Allen v. Second Judicial District Court, 
245 P.2d 999 (1952); New Hampshire, Hardware Mutual Casu-
alty Company v. Hopkins, 196 A.2d 66 (1963) (allowed in-
spection of policies but amounts of insurance coverage not 
required to be disclosed); New Jersey, Goheen v. Goheen, 154 
A.393 (1931); Oklahoma, Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (1957); 
South Dakota, Bean v. Best, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957). 
16 
Appellant, Case No. 10526, the question as to the dis-
covery of an insurance policy. It is anticipated that 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah will hand down 
its decision in the above cited case prior to any decision 
in this matter and that the law with reference to this 
matter will thereby be settled and the parties to this 
matter will be bound by the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the case referred to. 
The respondents by this reference adopt the ap-
pellants' brief in the case referred to and respectfully 
submit that the law is clear and that the Rules do not 
provide for the production of the insurance policy 
and that the policy is not subject to discovery. 
POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
THE PLAINTIF'F ARE NOT VIOLATED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF'S INABILITY TO JOIN 
THE INSURANCE CARRIER AS A PARTY 
DEFENDANT. 
The insurance contract runs to the insured and is 
an asset purchased and paid for by the insured to 
indemnify him against liability-for his own protection 
and not for the protection of anyone he may injure. 
The insured is the real party in interest and the appel-
lant's argument that his constitutional rights can only 
17 
be secured by permitting the joinder of the insurance 
carrier as a party defendant is novel and seems to the 
writer of this brief to be without merit. The plaintiff 
has not been, and is not being denied his day in court. 
If he establishes the respondents' liability and appel-
lant's damages, then the insurance carrier is required 
under law to respond in accordance with the terms of 
the insurance contract. The appellant can and will have 
a fair and impartial trial without the joinder of the 
insurance company as a party defendant. 
It seems to this writer that the appellant takes 
an inconsistent position. On the one hand, appellant 
wants the respondents to be bound strictly by the 
terms of the insurance contract so that any judgment 
taken against the insured will be paid by the insurer. 
On the other hand, appellant wants to disregard the 
terms of the insurance contract and proceed directly 
against the insurer. 
The appellant suggests that the plaintiff is at a 
disadvantage because he is opposed "by an insurance 
company with all its resources." We suggest that the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah will take judicial 
notice that the plaintiff is represenetd by reputable, 
competent, knowledgeable and resourceful counsel and 
that the plaintiff in this respect has resources equal to 
those of the insurance company. 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff will 
not be deprived of any of his constitutional rights by 
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denying him the right to join the insurance carrier as 
a party defendant. It is also suggested that to join 
the insurance carrier as a party defendant, in violation 
of the existing law and in violation of the insurance 
contract itself, would be to abrogate the constitutional 
rights of the insurance carrier. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
of the lower court in granting the respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss as to the insurance company defendant; 
in denying the production of the insurance policy and 
in refusing to order the respondents to answer inter-
rogatories and demands for admissions concerning the 
insurance coverage should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON 
& WATKISS 
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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